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FRANCE, EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES
Abdelkhaleq Be"amdane·
Fascination and rejection have always characterized Franco-American relations,
like an old couple who are not able to forgive: for France, the battle of Yorktown
where Lafayette and Rochambeau contributed to the independence of the former
British colonies; for the United States, American participation, twice, in the liberation
of France. Neither one willing to credit its salvation to the other. A tumultuous
relationship very much resembling the rocky history of the Statue of Liberty ("Liberty
Enlightening the World"), offered by a still fragile Republic to a distant sister, who
only begrudgingly offered it a pedestal. For centuries French literature has been rich
in lessons on this subject: from Tocqueville's wonderment and the anti-Americanism
of Baudelaire, Loti, Renan, Maurras, and many others,' to Victor Hugo's prediction
of indestructible ties between a United States of Europe and the United States of
America.
In fact, these troubled relations also resemble those between the United States and
Europe. America, Europe's child, has always sought to emancipate itself, while
Europe, it seems, does not want to admit that the child that it carried to maturity might
be more successful than it and might seek to tell it how to behave. This sentiment is
evident in both European and American literature, particularly in the works of James
Fennimore Cooper and Mark Twain, which unceasingly highlight the disparities
between the Old World and the New.
Have these divergences, which after all are quite natural given the inevitable
conflicts ofinterest between Europe and the United States-and between France and the
United States-reached a breaking point since the American invasion of Iraq? Ever
since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and even more since September 11th, is not America
seeking to "start the world anew" (to borrow words from Thomas Paine) in its own
image? Are we witnessing a "continental drift," accompanied by a lasting antagonism
between the United States and France?
In this three-way relationship-France/European Union/United States-where
France is seeking international stature, the European Union a European identity, and
the United States a world mission-French policy goals are marked by their continuity
(as is also true for the United States). If the world has changed, France's two priorities
since the commencement of the European project remain unchanged.
What Europe for France? France continues to want to make Europe into a
European Europe, not an Atlanticist Europe, but a Europe that is emancipated from
the United States.
Europe for what? France wants to make Europe a Europe alafran,;aise, a Frenchstyle Europe, which would be an enlarged extension ofFrance, increasing its influence

• Professor of Law, Universite de Tours. This article has been translated from the French. Unless
otherwise noted, all translations are the work of Laura Balladur.
I. Philippe Roger has traced the genealogy of French anti-Americanism in his book L'ENNEMI
AMERICAIN: GENEALOGIE DE L'ANTIAMERICAINISM FRANl;AJS (2002).
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on the international stage and providing a counterweight to the United States, today's
hyperpower.

I. A EUROPEAN

UNION

The Franco-American misunderstandings, differences, and divergences, which
reached a breaking point during the third Gulf War (March 2003), have deep roots.
They are the result of a different French vision of Europe and of its role on the
international stage, whose contours were outlined by General de Gaulle even before
he assumed power, and which throughout his years in power he worked to translate into
action. Despite certain deviations from this policy by his successors in order to
respond to changed strategic situations, the fundamental principle established by
General de Gaulle remained a constant. As he confided to Alain Peyrefitte, "I want
Europe to be European, that is to say, not American." 2 This vision is in stark contrast
to that formulated by the United States after the Second World War, which envisaged
a transatlantic Europe under American protection. For France, a European Europe had
to be balance point between East and West. And after the fall of the Wall, it must
become a Europe-Power (une Europe puissance).
A. A Europe as Balance Point
De Gaulle's European convictions, forged during the Second World War, were
refined during the Cold War. He sensed that because of its location in the "heart of
Europe" and its "universalist" past, France had to work for the unity of Europe, a
"Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals." For de Gaulle, "Communism will pass. In the
long run, no regime can survive against the national will." 3 He then laid out the bases
for French European diplomacy. One fundamental principle, cited no/ens vo/ens by
his successors throughout the Cold War, guided his European policy: the rejection of
American leadership, both political and strategic.
Rejection of American political leadership
Throughout the Cold War, the United States encouraged European integration.
A Europe divided into states and nations would not be able to confront the resurgence
of German militarism or dangers from the East. The European bloc had to be rebuilt.
The first piece of the structure was the Marshall Plan, whose establishment was
conditioned on the creation of a European organization to coordinate American aid.
This was a prelude to the creation of other European organizations. Following
principles enunciated by George Kennan, American leaders rejected an English-style,
free-market-economy Europe. While waiting for Great Britain to join the European
project, they thought that European integration could have at its core, at least at the
beginning, the Franco-German twosome. 4 They even envisioned a European

2. ALAIN PEYREFITTE,
C'ETAIT DEGAULLE,VOL. I 80 (1994).
3. See CHARLESDE GAULLE,MEMOIRESDEGUERRE:L'UNITE1942-1944 (1999).
4. See PPS/55: Outline: Study of U.S. Stance Toward Question of European Union, (July 7, 1949)
in 3 THE STATEDEPARTMENT
POLICYPLANNINGSTAFFPAPERS,
1947-1949 at 85 (1983); Klaus Schwabe,
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federation. 5 This Europe would of course have to develop under American leadership
and protection because the United States had no intention of sharing its political
leadership.
This approach was vividly expressed in the transatlantic partnership proposed by
President Kennedy in his speech of July 4, 1962, in which he spoke of a Europe
moving toward a pe,fect union, including the United Kingdom, a "partner" Europe,
complementary, rather than a "rival," to the United States. And throughout the Cold
War, successive American presidents never really challenged this idea, despite it
becoming evident, over time, that Europe was becoming an economic rival to the
United States.
This idea of Europe could not fail to run counter to that of France propounded by
General de Gaulle at the start of the Fifth Republic and retained since then, with some
variations to be sure, by his successors. For de Gaulle, "supranationality [was] absurd!
Nothing is above nations.''6 There is only one Europe, based on nation-states
cooperating among themselves. This was a Europe whose institutional contours he had
traced as early as his press conference on January 25, 1953, and to which he remained
faithful: "Instead ofan intolerable and impracticable fusion ... , [there should be] an
association ... [with] confederal institutions.'' Nevertheless, de Gaulle did not exclude
certain forms ofintegration (e.g., a common market, a common agricultural policy) and
in the long run the creation of a real "confederation which would be the crowning of
a patient effort to develop common policies, a common diplomacy, and common
security. " 7
On the international level, Europe, according to de Gaulle, should be neither a
"Russian colony'' nor an American "protectorate.'' If, following the war, he had
accepted out of necessity the "limited sovereignty" imposed by the two great powers
on their respective allies, he always considered that Europe had to be a "balancing
force" between the two great blocs. 8 In his speech ofMay 31, 1960, de Gaulle was very
explicit: "France, insofar as it is concerned, has recognized the necessity of a Western
Europe, once the dream of the wise and the ambition of the powerful, and which now
appears as the indispensable condition of global equilibrium," a Europe capable "of
acting as a counterweight to the two mastodons, the United States and Russia.'' 9
General de Gaulle, and his successors (with certain nuances and even differences for
some), rejected an American Europe, that is to say, a Europe tightly integrated and
"submissive" to the Anglo-Saxons. "Europe will be European or it will not be," he
proclaimed. 10 This is why he did not hesitate, twice, to veto the British candidacy (in
1963 and again in 1967), judging that Great Britain was simply an American
"satellite," a "Trojan horse" of the United States. He suspected that Great Britain

The United States, Western Security, and European Integration (1945-1963), in L'UNION EUROPEENNE
ET LESETATS-UNIS38, 38-39 (Michel Dumoulin & Genevieve Duchenne eds., 2003).
5. George W. Ball, The Past has Another Pattern, 209,213 (1982).
6. PEYREFITTE,supra note 2, at 88.
7. Id. at 90.
8. General Charles de Gaulle, President, Rally of the French People at Strasbourg (Apr. 7, 1947),
available at http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org/article.php3?id_article=517.
9. PEYREFITTE,supra note 2, at 81.
10. ALAINPEYREFITTE,C'ETAIT DE GAULLE,VOL. 2 355 (1997).
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wanted to create, in the end, not a United States of Europe, but a Europe of the United
States. 11 General de Gaulle never forgot what Churchill said to him on the eve of the
Normandy invasion: "each time we must choose between Europe and the open sea, we
shall always choose the open sea," that is, the United States. 12 Since that time, the
United Kingdom has become a member of the European Union, but recent history
proves the truth of Churchill's statement. For de Gaulle, as for his successors, ''two
policies, perfectly reconcilable, ought to be able to be developed, one for W estem
Europe and one for the United States. They ought to counterbalance each other." 13
From this he derived his rapprochement with China, and his position regarding United
States-led wars in Southeast Asia.
Rejection of American Strategic Leadership

For the United States, the construction of an integrated Europe had to occur under
an American umbrella. In any event, after the war Europe was in ruins and France and
the United Kingdom, once European powers, were only shadows of their former selves.
Present at the request of the Europeans, the United States sought to construct a
European regional defense capability whose supervision and strategic management it
would direct. De Gaulle, who had observed France's decline and who always had "a
certain idea ofFrance," rejected the idea that Europe's strategic direction be assumed
by the United States alone. Where Great Britain found refuge under the protective
American wing, France refused to nestle there. Receiving Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles on July 5, 1958, de Gaulle did not neglect to pass up the opportunity to
point out to him that France, "given the great history of the country, [was] aware of
having an important role to play in matters of global strategy .... [However,] until
now, not enough consideration had been given to France's role or to her position in
NATO or in the world." 14
Thus from the beginning, he felt that the Atlantic Alliance was certainly necessary,
but not sufficient, because, "if France [was] attacked, the Treaty itself would bring it
no aid." 15 He had also opposed the European Defense Community (EDC) foreseeing
the creation of a European army, a "melange apatride" ("a mix of stateless people"),
in which French soldiers would be placed under an American commander-in-chief in
Europe. 16

11. During his January 14, 1963, press conference, de Gaulle declared: "If Great Britain enters the
Union, the cohesion of all of its members would not resist it and in the end it would seem like an enormous
Atlantic community, subordinate to America and its leadership." (Translation of: "Si la Grande-Bretagne
entrait dans la Communaute, la cohesion de tous ses membres n 'y resisterait pas et en definitive, ii
apparaitrait une communaute atlantique colossale, sous dependance et direction americaine. ")
12. Winston S. Churchill, Comments to Charles de Gaulle on the Eve of the Normandy Invasion (June
6, 1944).
13. PEYREFITTE, supra note 10, at 79.
14. BERNARD LEDWIDGE, OE GAULLE ET LES AMERICAINS: CONVERSATIONS AVEC DULLES,
EISENHOWER, KENNEDY, RUSK 1958-1964 at 24-25 (1984).
15. CHARLES DE GAULLE, DISCOURS ET MESSAGES VOL. 2 at 287 (1949).
16. Id. at 564- 73.
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Once back in power, he hastened to re-launch France's nuclear rearmament.
Despite American pressure 17 and American refusal to cooperate with the French
nuclear program (contrary to the what the U.S. had done with the United Kingdom), 18
France quickly became a nuclear power. From then on, the United States sought to
subject this power to its control by proposing its integration into a "multilateral force"
under American command, a proposition that de Gaulle promptly rejected. Similarly,
while accepting the Atlantic Treaty, de Gaulle hastened to criticize the military
organization that emerged from it. As soon as he was back in power, he asked
American leaders to reorganize NATO's command structure. For him, an integrated
military organization was acceptable only to the extent that its scope of action covered
the Mediterranean, and the presence ofNATO's atomic weapons on French soil was
tolerable "only if France was responsible for their supervision and had the right to
decide on their use .... The use of these weapons had to be a French responsibility
with American participation. " 19 Faced with repeated American refusals, de Gaulle then
decided to withdraw from NATO (March 7, 1966), which entailed the dismantlement
of American bases in France and the transfer from France ofNATO's high command
(SACEUR) and its Central European Command. Since then, France has recovered full
sovereignty on its territory as well as plenary authority over its military forces. France
is an integral part of the Alliance, but it is not integrated into its military organization.
Not until the end of the Cold War did France consent to progressively reclaim its place
and its role in NATO institutions, but this in the context of a new approach to Europe
by France.
Despite certain rivalries (for the most part commercial, linked to the EU's
common agricultural policy) and certain disagreements (particularly, with regards to
President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative), French presidents from Pompidou to
Mitterrand have followed the two fundamental policies established by de Gaulle.
With the collapse of the Soviet colossus and the disappearance of the Soviet bear, the
United States became the only real great power. The question for France is no longer
simply how to oppose American tutelage over Europe, but also how to build, according
to president Chirac, a "Europe-Power .... We have to respond to a necessity: [to give
the European Union] a major role to play for peace in the world," which would
counterbalance the American hyperpower. 20

B. A Europe-Power
With the collapse of the Soviet bloc, America had lost its principal enemy. Some,
like Francis Fukayama, even proclaimed the "end of history'': 21 henceforth, liberal
ideology, the market economy, and democracy would spread throughout the world.
President George H.W. Bush, in a speech to Congress in September 1990, spoke ofa
"new world order," in which the United States would play the role once assigned by

17. LEDWIDGE,
supra note 14, at 24-25.
supra note 10, at 21.
18. PEYREFITTE,
19. LEDWIDGE,
supra note 14, at 26.
20. President Jaques Chirac, Speech delivered to the Institut des Hautes Eludes de Defense Nationale,
May 31, 2000 in LEMONDE,May 31, 2000.
21. See FRANCIS
FuKUYAMA,THEENDOFHISTORYANDTHELAsTMAN( 1992).
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Hegel to Napoleon. In this context, Secretary of State James Baker's proposal of 1991
for a "Euro-Atlantic Community from Vancouver to Vladivostok" 22 would integrate
the European Union into a vast world body under American leadership. This idea was
totally consumed in the Yugoslav conflagration. The United States had to intervene to
put an end to this "tribal conflict" and to reevaluate its strategy of making NATO the
structuring organization for Europe. The most spectacular turnaround in American
diplomacy, however, was brought about by the administration of President George W.
Bush. Immediately upon entering office in January 2001, Bush, surrounded by a
number of neoconservative strategists, reconnected with an aspect of the American
imperial tradition that was both messianic and religious. "The cause of America,"
Thomas Paine had declared two centuries earlier, "is in a great measure the cause of
all mankind." 23 This messianism, reminiscent in some ways of France during the
Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire, eventually came up against another form of
messianism, championed today by France and Germany, that is ethical, universalist,
and European. Its aim is to project European Union values onto the international stage
and to make the European Union a force for maintaining a balance of power in the
world.
A Power of Attraction

"[Europeans] have stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian
world of perpetual peace," says Robert Kagan of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace and a leading exponent ofneoconservative ideas. 24 America has to
assert its military power without second thoughts in order to encourage and support a
liberal world order and to assure global security. According to Kagan, the power of the
United States differs from the weakness of Europe, which, having entered into "a postmodern paradise," has renounced hard power. 25 "That is why on the major strategic
and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans from
Venus." 26 Such divergences are bound to endure. ''The divisive trend they together
produce," Kagan notes, "may be impossible to reverse." 27
Even if the premises of this thesis, which is at the root of the thinking of the
neoconservative members of the present Bush administration, seem well founded, the
consequences to which they lead seem problematic to French leaders. For in fact it is
not clear that the choice for Europeans is between the repudiation or the acceptance of
dependence on American hegemony. 28 In reality we are presented with two models,
two visions of the world. "There is not power on the one hand and weakness on the
other; but rather two ways of thinking about the values and interests which contend

22. James A. Baker ill, Sec'y of State, The Euro-Atlantic Architecture: From West to East, Speech to
the Aspen Institute in Berlin, Germany (June 18, 1991).
23. THOMASPAINE,COMMON
SENSE64 (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Classics 1986) (1776).
24. ROBERTKAGAN, OF PARADISE
AND POWER:AMERICA
AND EUROPEIN THENEWWORLDORDER
57 (2003).
25. Id. at 53.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. at 11.
28. Id. at 15.
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with each other," notes Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin. 29 On the one hand, he
adds, there is "American power ... which has recourse to the classic elements of force,
especially military power," and on the other "Europe [which] has cast its lot with
power based on law."3°Furthermore, European power is soft power, in comparison
with American power, which is based on diplomacy backed by force. As the Belgian
Minister ofF oreign Affairs has emphasized "the United States seems to operate on the
basis of coercive force, while the European Union operates on the basis of the power
of attraction," 31 the attraction of its values 32 which are not necessarily those of the
United States.33 Europe exerts an extraordinary power of attraction, as demonstrated
by the many bids for membership in the Union and requests for partnerships from
countries both near and far.
As emphasized by the work plan adopted by the European Council at the Laeken
Summit on December 14-15, 2001, for the members of the European Convention
chosen to draft a constitutional treaty for Europe, the goal is to make Europe into "a
power wanting to change the course of world affairs in such a way as to benefit not just
the rich countries but also the poorest. A power seeking to set globalization within a
moral framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable
development." 34 The members of the Convention, by direction from the French
government and from other European governments, have in fact inscribed these values
in stone in the proposed 2004 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. 35
Moreover, they have included a general clause making these values overriding goals

29. DOMINIQUEDE VILLEPIN,UN AUTRE MONDE 340-41 (2003) (for the English translation, see
DoMINIQUEDEVILLEPIN,Tow ARDA NEW WORLD:SPEECHES,ESSAYS,ANDINTERVIEWS
ONTHEw AR IN
IRAQ,THEUN, ANDTHECHANGINGFACEOF EUROPE(Melville House 2004)).
30. Id. at 341.
31. Louis Michel, Les Relations transatlantiques: Comment comb/er /es relations de puissance entre
/'Europe et /es Etats-Unis d'Amerique, in CAHIERSDE LA PESC: NO. 4 154-55 (2004).
32. According to President Jacques Chirac,
Europe has created a model: after totalitarianism, two World Wars, the Holocaust, and
nearly fifty years of Cold War, it decided to break free from power games. Its peoples have
established an area of peace, democracy, solidarity, and prosperity, founded on the freely
conferred sharing of sovereignty. This had made the European Union an original and
exemplary international actor.
President Jacques Chirac, Speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (Nov. 18, 2004)
(transcript available on line at http://www.iiss.org/conferencepage.php?confID=70);
see also Mario Soares,
Reflexion d'un Sage Europeen, LE FIGARO,May 27, 2005.
33. On the differences in values between France and Europe on the one hand and the United States on
the other, see JACQUESANDREANI,L' AMERIQUEETNOUS(2000), and by the same author, Les Etats-Unis
et I 'Europe: une relation turbulente, Un point de vue europeen, 9 QUESTIONSINTERNA
TIONALES
23 (2004).
34. Laeken Declaration 273/01, The Future of the European Union, (Dec. 15, 2001) available at
http://europa.eu.int/constitution/futurum/documents/offiext/doc
15120 I_ en.htm.
35. Article 1-3 § 4 of the draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe:
In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and
interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth,
solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and
the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict
observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles
of the United Nations Charter.
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) I, art. 1-3 § 4. These
values are reiterated in article ill-292 with the notable inclusion of multilateralism. Id. at art. ill-292.

HeinOnline -- 58 Me. L. Rev. 384 2006

2006]

FRANCE, EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES

385

for the different types of international action that may be undertaken by the European
Union. 36
Thus in order to propagate its values, the European Union uses soft power, ''this
aspect of power-to make others want what you want ... ; which co-opts, rather than
imposes," a power based on influence rather than on coercion. 37 This soft approach can
be explained with historical and institutional reasons. The priority of brute force, the
choice of unilateralism, and the scorn ofintemational law in international relations of
the present Bush administration are approaches which run counter to the European
project, which is founded on respect for law, the search for compromise through
negotiation, and the rejection of hegemonic ambitions and the use of force. More
serious, America's vision of the international order is perceived by the "Old Europe,"
(headed by France), as a danger to the universal message of which Europe feels itself
to be the bearer; worse still, the American vision appears to be a threat to the
foundations and the very existence of the European Union as it has been progressively
built for more than half a century. As General de Gaulle declared in 1964, "American
imperialism [and] American supremacy [are] an enormous danger to the world." 38
A Power for Global Balance

Europe is a historically ''unique model," based as it is on a balance between unity
and diversity and between federalism and national sovereignty. At the moment of''the
construction ofa new international order founded on justice, law, and solidarity ... [let
us make] of Europe a force for balance" in the world, proclaimed Dominique de
Villepin, former Minister for Foreign Affairs and current Prime Minister. 39 In the
"reestablishment of the global system" presently in progress, Europe must be able to
play a central role. There are three aspects of this task, which French leaders have
ascribed to the European Union.
First, the rejection of unilateralism. No power, whether it be the principal power
or not, can take sole charge, or be the bearer of the vision, for the construction of a new
global balance. 40 French leaders reject the translation of American hegemony into a
unilateral, simplifying approach to the world, one which contrasts the axis of good to
''the axis of evil," 41 a vision of international relations which, encouraged by the ideas
of Samuel Huntington, sees the battle against terrorism as a ''war [ad infinitum] to save

36. Id.§ 3.
ONLYSUPERPOWER
POWER:WHYTHEWORLD'S
OFAMERICAN
37. JOSEPHS.NYE,JR.,THEPARADOX
CAN'TGo IT AlONE9 (2002).
supra note I0, at 77. Generalde Gaulle confided to Alain Peyrefittein 1962: "America
38. PEYREFITTE,
can explode because of terrorism or racism or what have you, and become a threat to the peace. The Soviet
Union can explode because communism will collapse and its nationalities will quarrel. It can become
supra note 2, at 386. (Translation of: "L'Amerique, confie en 1962 le general
threatening." PEYREFITTE,
de Gaulle a A. Peyrefitte, peut exploser du fait du terrorisme, ou du racisme, que sais-je, et devenir une
menace pour Ia paix. L'Union sovietique peut exploser, parce que le communisme s'effondrera, que ses
peoples se chamailleronvol. Elle peut devenir mena~ante.").
supra note 29, at 167.
39. VILLEPIN,
40. See id.; see also Patrick Sabatier et al., Interviewwith Michel Bamier, Minister ofForeign Affairs,
LEMONDE,Mar. 3, 2005.
41. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002).
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[western] civilization." 42 Because, as Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin remarks,
"unilateral action is utopian, but above all it is obsolete .... No state is in the position
to respond to the triple challenge of security, economic growth, and social
improvement .... The affirmation of a solid multilateral system is the key to the order
oftomorrow." 43 And this multilateral system, reflection ofa multi-polar world, is based
on three elements. First, a necessary respect for state sovereignty. Thus, for President
Chirac, ''we are friends and allies of the United States, but we aren't servants.'""' This
rejection of limited sovereignty applied to the allies of the United States is also
accompanied with the rejection of the American idea of reduced sovereignty
authorizing world-wide military intervention and sanctions against "rogue" states, 45 as
determined by the interests of the United States. Multilateralism also rests on the
respect of legally-established alliances. France rejects the idea of an alliance a la
carte, 46 such as that formulated by Donald Rumsfeld in the aftermath of the attacks of
September 11, that ''the mission determines the coalition, and not the reverse," 47 and
applied in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq-devaluing NATO by turning it into a
mere repository of resources. Moreover, France rejects the idea that NATO, through
"non-article 5" missions, should become a little U.N ., encompassing all security
problems, with a mandate to intervene without limit anywhere in the world. Finally, it
is a "multilateralism which must be based on a reformed and strengthened United
Nations," 48 because only the United Nations has the legitimacy necessary to lead or
authorize international action, particularly military action.
Second, the rejection by France and other European Union countries of the
preventive war doctrine, as formulated by the present Bush administration in The
National Security Strategy of the United States of America of September 2002 and
implemented during the Iraqi conflict. Admittedly, the "Bush doctrine" speaks of
preemptive war, but it is in fact what international law calls preventive war, since the
United States-which wishes to remain the principal military power in the
world-intends ''to act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. " 49 If
every country adopted a preventive doctrine, and intervened militarily on its own, the
world would undoubtedly degenerate into chaos, for how can anyone judge a threat

42. See generally SAMUELP. HUNTINGTON,
THE CLASHOF CIVILIZATIONS
ANDTHEREMAKINGOF
WORLDORDER(Touchstone 1997).
43. VILLEPIN,supra note 29, at 199-200.
44. President Jacques Chirac, Address at the NATO Summit Press Briefing in Istanbul (June 29, 2004),
http://www.elysee.fr/.
45. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation from World Congress Center in Atlanta: War on
Terror(Nov. 8, 2001).
46. France rejected any intervention by NATO to stabilize the situation in Iraq (even though it had
agreed to it in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan) on the ground that, according to Jacques Chirac, "any
intervention by NA TO in this region seems to us to entail a great risk of confrontation between the Christian
West and the Muslim East." President Jacques Chirac, Address Following the GS Summit in Sea Island,
Georgia (June 10, 2004) available at http://www.elysee.fr/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
47. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Speaks in Washington (Sept. 23, 2001)
(transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/O I 09/23/se.02.html).
48. President Jaques Chirac, Speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (Nov. 18, 2004)
(transcript available at http://www.iiss.org/conferencepage.php?conflD=70).
49. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY OF AMERICA 4 (2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.
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that is not yet fully formed? "The doctrine of self-defense would be enlarged abusively,
without limit or constraint .... Force must be put in the service of law," 5°French
leaders stress forcefully.
Third, "Confronted with a new world," asserts Dominique de Villepin, "it is
imperative that actions of the international community be guided by principles. First
and foremost is respect for law. Keystone of the international order, it must be applied
in all circumstances." 51 This is not the case with the policy followed by the Bush
administration. It has greatly accelerated the movement for the dismantling of
international law already under way for several years in the legal policies of the United
States, which have erected into near dogma constitutional nationalism and a double
standard. For instance, the American Constitution and American legislation prevail
over international agreements, 52 including the United Nations Charter, and that
whenever the vital interests of the United States are involved it would be a "mistake"
to ask the U.N. "to sanction the use of ... power." 53 On the other hand, according to
Robert Kagan's observations, the present Bush administration employs a "double
standard": 54 the international rule applies to others, but not to the United States (for
instance, American nationals must not be subject to the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court) and also the rule oflaw is not applicable to the enemies of the United
States (for example, the non-application of the Geneva Conventions, judged to be
"obsolete," to persons considered by the Bush administration to be "enemy
combatants" or "irregular combatants"; 55 and the authorization of the torture oflraqi
and Al Qaida prisoners, 56 etc.). This conception, damaging to the very credibility of the
new order that the United States wants to impose on the rest of the world, strongly and
deeply conflicts in the most obvious way with the convictions of Europeans, and of
France, which sees itself as the leader of a French-inspired Europe.
IL A EUROPE ALA FRAN<;AISE
France, even though today a mid-level power, would like to "retain its [former]
rank on the international stage;" France, "beacon to the world," wants to remain as "the
third international reality," 57 after the United States and Russia. But what is to be done
when it no longer possesses the political means to pursue its own policies? De
Gaulle-who never forgot how he himself, and through him, a defeated France, were
treated by Churchill and Roosevelt as negligible during and after the Second World

50. VILLEPIN,
supra note 29, at 118-19.
51. Id. at 104.
52. See ABDELKHALEQ
BERRAMDANE,
LA HIERARCHIE
DESDROITS. DROITSINTERNES
ET DROIT
EUROPEEN
ETINTERNATIONAL
(2003).
53. Condoleezza Rice, Promoting the National Interest, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS,
Jan./Feb. 2000, at 45, 4748.
54. Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, 113 POL'Y REV. (2002), http://www.policyreview.org/
jum02/kagan.html.
55. Memorandum from Albert Gonzales to the President (Jan. 25, 2002); Memorandum from President
George W. Bush (2002), in LE MONDE,Jan. 8, 2005.
56. Memorandum from the Ministry of Justice on the rules of conduct during interrogations (Aug. I,
2002), in LE MONDE,(June I 0, 2004, Jan. 8, 2005).
57. ALAINPEYREFITTE,
C'ETAITDEGAULLE,VOL.4 292-94 (2002).
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War-came to realize that the future of France depended on Europe. "What is the
purpose of Europe?" he confided to Alain Peyrefitte:
It must be used to prevent us from being dominated, either by the Americansor the
Russians. The Six of us ought to be able to do just as well as each of the two
superpowers.And if France manages to be the first of the Six, which is within our
reach, it will be in the position to wield Archimedes lever. It will be able to lead the
others along. Europe is a meansfor Franceto become again what it ceasedto be after
Waterloo: the first in the world.58

To build Europe and to be captain of the team, this has been one of the major
directions of French diplomacy since the beginning of the Fifth Republic until today.
In so doing, France's objective is, and always has been, to counterbalance the
transatlantic partnership so that it might "confidently move forward. " 59

A. Europe as a Lever to Increase French Influence
Paul Valery predicted at the beginning of the 20th century that Europe was visibly
aspiring to be governed by an American authority; all European policies pointed in that
direction. 60 But France still rejects this notion. The successive presidents of the Fifth
Republic, with great continuity, but not without certain stylistic differences, were all
convinced that France, as a mid-level power could only be strong by and in Europe.
Like his predecessors-de Gaulle, Giscard d'Estaing, and Fran~ois Mitterand-President
Jacques Chirac repeatedly reminds France that "Europe increases [the] strength [of
France] on the international stage.',61 This is so because Europe serves both as a
vehicle for French policies and a megaphone for its strategic ambitions.

Europe as vehicle for French policies
"The European Union is a multiplier of [French] influence.',62 This effect is felt
first in Europe. Because how indeed could France project its ambition to act effectively
in the world through the Union if the Union had not already imbibed, or been infused
with, the French vision of Europe? That is why French leaders work to instill, infuse,
and diffuse their idea of power in the construction of Europe. They want to "bring into
being a real European power," 63 and strive to give it both body and soul. According to

58. Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
59. VILLEPIN,supranote29,at 151.
60. See PAULVALERY,REFLECTIONS
ONTHEWORLDTODAY(Francis Scarfe trans.) (1948).
61. President Jacques Chirac, Referendum on the European Constitution: Statement to the French by
M. Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, (May 3 I, 2005), http://www.elysee.fr.elysee.fr/anglais/
speeches_ and_ documents/2005/referendum _ on_ the_ european _ constitution _statement_ to_ the_ french _ b
y_m_jacques_chirac_president_of_the_republic.30886.html.
62. Interview with Michel Barnier, Minister of Foreign Affairs, LIBERATION,
(Feb. 7, 2005).
63. President Jacques Chirac, Declaration aux Fran~ais sur le referendum sur le traite etablissant une
Constitution pour !'Europe, (May 26, 2005), http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais/interventions/
interviews_articles_de_presse_et_interventions_televisees./2005/mai/declaration_aux_francais_sur_le_r
eferendum _ francais _sur _le_ traite _ constitutionnel _pour _I_ europe.29980.html.
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Michel Barnier, former Minister ofForeign Affairs, even if"Europe is [today] a power
in the world, it is not yet a world power. This transition is our greatest challenge.''64
Also, for French leaders the drafting of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe, signed in Rome on October 29, 2004, was the ideal opportunity to crystallize
in a foundational text their national aspirations. They succeeded in part, thanks to help
from Germany. They succeed to such an extent that to the question: "Does the Treaty
strengthen France in Europe?" President Jacques Chirac responds ''yes, [without
hesitation]." 65 Among other things the constitutional treaty increases the number of
votes France has in the European Council by 50%, accepts its social and cultural
models (protection of the public service sector, safeguarding the French cultural
exception), and incorporates the values it holds dear (the Charter of Fundamental
Rights).
In addition, the constitutional treaty accepts, in part, French institutional ideas for
Europe. It represents a compromise between French and German conceptions. 66 Most
notably, it provides for a strong and stable Union presidency-halfway between a
French-style president and a German-style president-who would lead and coordinate
the work of the European Council and who would be responsible for representing the
Union abroad and capable of speaking for Europe on the international stage. 67 It also
provides for a Minister ofForeign Affairs, with a triple responsibility (to the European
Council, to the President of the Commission, and to the European Parliament), in
charge of the PESC/PESD (Politique etrangere et de securite commune/Po/itique
Europeenne de Securite et de Defense, or Common Foreign and Security Policy/
European Security and Defense Policy) and assuring the consistency and coordination
of the Union's external relations. 68
Furthermore, the constitutional treaty accepts, in part, France's strategic choices
for Europe. First, the proposed Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe
constitutionalizes and consolidates, albeit cautiously and pragmatically, the strategy
of military power for the Union, a policy introduced by France along with Germany
and with the cautious support of the United Kingdom (since the Cologne Summit of
June 3-4, 1999). This is a strategy of existential autonomy with respect both to NATO
and to the principal European military power, the United States. Thus, the
constitutional treaty is leading slowly but surely toward a common defense, as
championed by France, resting on civil and military instrumentalities, on the

64. Michel Barnier, MinisterofForeign Affairs, Address at the 30eme anniversaire du centred' Analyse
et de Prevision "Comprendre pour agir" (July 9, 2004).
65. President Jacques Chirac, supra note 63.
66. See the Franco-German contributions to the European Convention headed by former French
President Valery Giscard d'Estaing (the Convention produced a first draft of the constitutional treaty which
was later amended in small ways by the Intergovernmental Conference): (I) in the area of European security
and defense policy (CONY 422/02, CONTRIB 150, Nov. 22, 2002); (2) in the area of justice and home
affairs (CONY 435/02, CONTRIB 156, Nov. 28, 2002); (3) with respect to the institutional structure of the
Union (CONY 489/03, CONTRIB 192, Jan. 16, 2003); available at http://european-convention.eu.int/
bienvenue.asp?lang=EN.
67. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1, art. 1-22.
68. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) I, art. 1-28. For
further discussion of this subject, see ABDELKHALEQBERRAMDANE
ANDJEAN ROSSETIO, LE DROIT
INSTITUTIONNEL
DE L'UNIONEUROPEENNE
(2005).
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availability of national forces placed at the disposition of the Union, and on a European
Defense Agency for armaments (article 1-41 of the Treaty).
Finally, in accordance with the Union's "global vision of security," called for by
France, with German support, the constitutional treaty elaborates a strategy of
functional autonomy for the Union. 69 On the one hand, such a strategy aims at the
defense of the independence and territorial integrity of the Union with the inclusion of
a clause calling for collective solidarity against terrorism (article 1-43) and the
borrowing of the collective self-defense clause from the UEO 70 (article 1-47). On the
other hand, it aims at the actual projection of Union power beyond its "frontiers." In
this respect the constitutional treaty incorporates certain joint Franco-German
proposals. To this end it provides for: (1) crisis management missions anywhere in the
world that would be entrusted to all member states together or just to some of them (141 §1 and §5); (2) enhanced cooperation in the area of defense (article 1-44); and (3)
"structured cooperation," a more limited form of cooperation outside of the "Eurodefense-zone," open to those member states with sufficient military capacity (article
1-41 §6).
If "France is building itself up and strengthening itself in Europe," it is also
positioning itself as a world power through the European Union. 71
Europe as megaphone for France

Europe is an instrument for the projection of France's ambition to be a factor on
the world stage and for the amplification of its role as global actor. But it is also an
instrument for the projection of the global power of the United States. Europe serves
the strategic ambitions of both the United States and France. As Zbigniew Brzezinski
judiciously notes, "Basically, France would like a world in which [its] voice, projected
by Europe, echoed throughout the globe. Most French citizens understand that, by
[itself], France is a middling power. But if Europe's power can be harnessed, France
will be able to attain the world role to which [it] clearly aspires." 72
France positions itself as a world power not only through the European Union, but
also through other international organizations. For the United States, however,
international organizations are primarily institutions that limit (or occasionally
legitimize) American omnipotence. In this respect the European Union is a lever for
increasing France's power,just as are international organizations, especially the United
Nations Security Council and NATO, where France has veto power. Through the
Security Council, France's voice is heard and counts, as is amply demonstrated by its
attitude within the Security Council at the time of the Iraq war and later by its
conciliatory attitude toward the United States at the close of hostilities, when the

69. Dominique de Villepin & Joschka Fischer, Contribution presentingjoint Franco-German proposals
for the European Convention in the field of European Security and Defence policy, (CONV 422/02,
CONTRIB 150, Nov. 22, 2002), avai/ab/eathttp://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00422en2.pdf.
70. Union de !'Europe Occidentale (Western European Union).
71. VILLEPIN,supra note 29, at 169.
72. Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor under Jimmy Carter, LE
MONDE(July 13, 2004); see generally ZBIGNIEWBRZEZINSKI,
LE VRAI CHOIJ{:LES ETATSUNIS ET LE
RESTEDUMONDE(2004).
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United States once again referred the Iraq matter to the U.N. And France's role within
NA TO is undeniable, as is demonstrated by its opposition during the Kosovo conflict
to American bombing of certain targets in Serbia and its opposition to any relief of
allied forces by NATO.
However, France alone, if isolated in Europe, cannot effectively influence its
partners or cause them to follow its lead. An alliance within the European alliance is
necessary: thus we have the Franco-German couple. General de Gaulle understood this
as early as the 1960s, when he concluded the Franco-German Elysee Treaty of
Friendship on January 22, 1963. And since then, this agreement has never come
undone. The Franco-German couple has become the driving force behind the European
project. The great advances from the Single European Act to the Treaties of
Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice, and finally the proposed Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe have been above all the work of the Franco-German axis.
Moreover, within this tandem, France intends to remain, if not the leader, at least the
equal of Germany. Witness the bitter Franco-German bargaining during the European
Summit in Nice in December 2000. President Jacques Chirac, in effect, rejected at all
costs any uncoupling of France and Germany with respect to the number of votes that
each of the two countries would have in decision-making in the Council of the
European Union. For the chief of state, it was vital that France retain the same number
of votes as Germany, despite Germany's greater population since its reunification and
its more advanced economy.
But how can France's echo be amplified on the international stage when its voice
becomes increasingly muffled and its influence weaker within the European Union?
One of the principal effects of the successive enlargements is the dilution of the French
presence within the Union's institutions. 73 The increase in the number of member states
has led to a reduction in the number of French members of the European Parliament
(from 87 to 72), the loss of a second French commissioner, and the diminution of
French voting power in the Council; not to mention the decline of the use of the French
language, an important means of influence, within Union institutions. France's image
and its political influence within the Union are also suffering from the arrogance of its
leaders (as was the case during the Union's internal divisions concerning the Iraq
war) 74 and from the wariness of certain member states of the idea of a European power,
which would be built against the United States. Finally, the blocking of the French
project, by opening Union membership to Turkey, a move favored by the United
States, and finally accepted by France, seems to indicate a renouncement by President
Jacques Chirac of a Europe as a power in favor of a European space ( sort of a EuroMediterranean union), an idea favored by the United Kingdom and the United States.

73. Before the fifth enlargement, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom each had ten votes
and Spain eight votes. A qualified majority required sixty-two votes out of eighty-seven. As of November
I, 2004, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy each had twenty-nine votes, and Spain and
Poland had twenty-seven. A qualified majority now required 232 votes out of a total of 321 votes, also
representing 62 percent of the population of the Union.
74. President Jacques Chirac had declared that the leaders of the Union's future member states who had
supported the United States had "wasted a good opportunity to shut up." See Charles M. Sennott, War a
'Last Resort,' European Leaders Declare at Summit,' BOSTONGLOBE, Feb. 18, 2003, at Al.
HeinOnline -- 58 Me. L. Rev. 391 2006

392

MA.INELAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:2

B. Europe as a Counterweight to the Transatlantic Partnership
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Europe have each reclaimed
part of their respective freedom. The alliance is no longer a vital necessity in the face
of a common monolithic enemy. It has become, according to French leaders, a choice
to be made to confront the multiple and shifting dangers and challenges of today. And
"it is in the interest of the United States to understand that neither it nor the Europeans
can confront alone the world's challenges." 75 Each must be aware, advises President
Jacques Chirac, that "the long-standing preeminence of the West and its example" is
"now being challenged" and that a "multipolar world" is already a reality, with Europe
as one of its components. 76 This multipolar vision is not shared by American leaders. 77
They seem to fear the emergence of a real European power that would rival that of the
United States in spite of the fact that French leaders unceasingly call for a "refoundation" of transatlantic relations on a more equal footing. 78

Europe, a Counterweight to the Transatlantic Partnership?
On the one hand, with the disappearance of the Soviet bloc, European integration
no longer seems to be a priority for the United States. Europe seems to be less and less
at the center of American foreign policy. This devaluation of the European Union
appears to be fostered and encouraged by the neoconservatives-who
are very
influential in the present Bush administration-who recommend that Washington slow
down the process of European integration, if not push for its dismemberment, and
encourage enlargement of the Union to the detriment ofits deepening in order to better
dilute the European project. 79
On the other hand, the United States wants to protect itself against the European
will to exist and to become a world player, capable of rivaling the United States itself,
if not threatening its hegemony. A politically and economically powerful Europe,
emancipated from military dependence on the United States might compete with the
United States and even contest its preeminence.
The American attitude toward Europe thus remains ambivalent, oscillating
between relative disinterest and the fear of witnessing the emergence of a
counterweight to the United States. This ambivalence is evident on the political,
economic, and military levels.
On the political level, the Bush administration is divided. It is careful to see in the
European Union an ally capable of helping the United States in areas like the struggle
against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (the cases oflran
and North Korea), and with regional conflicts (Afghanistan and the Middle East). But

75. Interview with Michel Barnier, supra note 62.
76. President Jacques Chirac, Special Address to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (Nov.
18, 2004), http:/ /www.iiss.org/conferencepage.php?conf1D=70.
77. In her June 26, 2003 speech before the International Institute for Strategic Studies, then National
Security Adviser Condaleezza Rice declared: "Multi-polarity is a theory of rivalry; of competing
interests-and at its worst-competing values." (transcript available at http://www.iiss.org).
78. VILLEPIN,supra note 29, at 344, 348.
79. On American neoconservative literature, see SALAMEGHASSAN,QUANDL' AMERIQUEREFAIT LE
MONDE355 et seq. (2005).
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it is also apprehensive with respect to European institutions, favoring bilateral alliances
with loyal countries (like the United Kingdom), and taking advantage of divisions
between European countries (as was the case at the time of the Iraq war and with
respect to the International Criminal Court with American pressure on candidate states
to conclude bilateral agreements with it to exempt American nationals from the
jurisdiction of the Court).
On the economic level, it is clear that the European Union and the United States
are two superpowers and indispensable partners (with respect to commercial intercourse and the flow of investments between the two entities). But this does not
preclude rivalries, as the negotiations for the liberalization of trade within the World
Trade Organization demonstrated. Especially telling is the increase in disputes between the United States and the European Union that have been brought before the
organization pursuant to its Dispute Settlement Understanding. 80
Finally and most importantly, on the strategic level, the United States has finally
accepted that the European Union possesses an autonomous European defense and
security policy, separate from that of NATO. But the United States still seeks to
control it, as witnessed by the different arrangements concluded between the two
organizations, with the following results: (1) the affirmation, to NATO's advantage,
ofa "right of first refusal," that is, a right of preemption in favor ofNATO to deal with
a given crisis; (2) the Union can decide to undertake military operations with its own
resources, but only in exceptional situations-it must accord priority to the
mechanisms established by the so-called "Berlin plus" agreement ofMarch 17, 2003,
by resorting first to NATO resources so as to avoid needless duplication. Given these
conditions, we might very well wonder if the United States really accepts an active role
for Europe or if it does not consider the Union simply as "a reservoir of forces
available to support American initiatives or to take over from the United States in postconflict stabilization situations. " 81
A Renewed Transatlantic Partnership?
From the American perspective, the European-Atlantic partnership is necessary
for both entities. It might even rest on two pillars, but two pillars unequal in size, in
what would be, in effect, an asymmetrical relationship. According to Zbigniew
Brezezinski:
The only real option is not a European partner of equal weight, and even less a
European counterweight, but a European partner with weighty influence in the
shaping and implementation of a shared global policy. The exercise of critically
important influence, even if it does not involve exactly an equal share of decisionmaking, requires a willingness on both sides to act together when action is needed. 82

80. See, e.g., proceedings concerning European steel, agricultural subsidies on both sides of the
Atlantic, American Foreign Sales Corporations, genetically modified organisms, etc.
81. JEANFRAN<;:OIS
PONCET,ETAL.,RELATIONS
TRANSATLANTIQUES:
QUELLES
PERSPECTIVES
POURLE
SECONDMANDATDU PRESIDENTBUSH? RAPPORTD'INFORMATION
No.307 (April 14, 2005),
http://senat.fr/rapsen.html.
82. BRZEZINSKI,
supra note 72.
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France rejects this unequal dependence, which it finds obsolete at the very time when
"we must embark upon a real refoundation of the global system." 83 According to the
former Minister ofF oreign Affairs Michel Bamier, "alliance does not mean allegiance.
A renewed Atlantic Alliance must rest on two pillars [European and American], " 84 but
''two symmetrical and equal pillars, sharing the burden but also the responsibilities. " 85
A European power would not necessarily come into being to the detriment of the
United States. To the contrary, according to French leaders, a stronger Europe would
contribute to a stronger partnership. What is more, they add, it is in the best interest of
the United States for Europe to provide a counterweight to the American vision. "A
European power would actually be useful to everyone, even to the United States, which
would be better served by being able to work out friendly and cooperative limits to its
own actions." 86 In conclusion, we cannot treat France's wish for independence and its
positioning as a great power as simple "whims without consequence." It is hard to
consider the presence of the United States on the old continent as a vital necessity
without which Europe would return to its old demons; it is likewise difficult to
conceive that any "challenge to the Atlantic relationship would be fatal to the destiny
of Europe." 87 The Cold War is over! A new era has begun. In this age of
globalization, we are witnessing the emergence of new entities, of new centers of
power, and Europe is certainly one of them. There is no question that the Atlantic
partnership will remain a necessity, but a necessity of choice-a "balanced partnership," in the words of Jacques Chirac-which serves the interests of both protagonists
if they want to continue together to enjoy global preeminence. Otherwise, the
relationship might continue to deteriorate. As Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in 1835,
"[T]he two continents [Europe and America] can never live entirely independently
from each other: there exist too many natural ties between their needs, their ideas, there
habits, and their customs. " 88 But even at the dawn of the 21st century, this dependence
has to be equal and mutually advantageous.

83. VILLEPIN,supra note 29, at 342.
84. Interview with Michel Bamier, supra note 62.
85. The approach is shared by Germany: "We can only have stable transatlantic relations if the two
pillars of this bridge across the North Atlantic are able to bear more or less the same burden," asserted
Joschka Fischer, former German Foreign Minister, Speech at Princeton University: Europe and the Future
of Transatlantic Relations (Nov. 19, 2003).
86. Isabelle Lasserre & Gregory Rayko,lnterview with Hubert Vedrine: Pourune "Europepuissance, "
106 POLITIQUEINTERNATIONALE
21 (2004/2005), available at http://www.politiqueintemationale.
com/Pl_pSO/fram _ dp _ 106_ 05 _re.htm.
87. BRZEZINSKI,
supra note 72, at 124, 128. According to Brzezinski, Europe "cannot be secure
without America, it cannot unite against America." Id. at 293.
88. 1 ALEXISDE TOQUEVILLE,
DE LA DEMOCRATIE
ENAMERIQUE524 (Flammarion 1981) (1835).
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